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What's New > ADR Cases > Dubow Arb Case Report 2005-on

Updated October 15, 2008

Paul Dubow Arbitration Case Report 2005 to 2008

 

ARBITRATION

Case List By Name

 

Advantage Medical Services LLC v Hoffman (2008) (Disclosure)

Aral v. EarthLink, Inc. (2005) (Forum Selection)

Baker v. Osborne Development Corp.  (2007) (Arbitrability)

Baker v. Osborne Development Corp. (2007) (Unconscionability)

Berg v Traylor (2007) (Minors)

Berglund v. Arthroscopic & Laser Surgery Center of San Diego LP, (2008) (Discovery Disputes)

Boghos v Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London (2005) (Forum Fees)

Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London (2005) (Service of Suit Clause)

Boucher v. Alliance Title Company, Inc. (2005) (Nonsignatories)

Brodke v Alphatec Spine, Inc. (2008) (Petition to Compel Arbitration)

Bruni v Didion (2008) (Arbitrability)

Bruni v Didion (2008) (Unconscionability)

Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (2006) (Arbitrability)

Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc. (2006) (Class Action Permitted)

Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc. (2006) (Errors of Law)

Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc. (2006) (Refusal to Admit Evidence)

Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc.  (2006) (Severance)

Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates (9th Cir 2007) (Injunctive Relief)

Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates (9th Cir 2007) (Manifest Disregard of the Law)

Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates (9th Cir 2007) (Nonsignatories)

Comer v. Micor, Inc. (9th Cir 2006) (Nonsignatories)

Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald (9th Cir 2005) (Ethics Standards)

Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald (9th Cir. 2005) (Preemption)

Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) (Consolidation in Litigation)

Cummings v. Future Nissan (2005) (Appeal to Second Arbitrator)

Cummings v. Future Nissan (2005) (Waiver of Issue)

Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) (Class Action Waiver)

Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) (Preemption)

Ervin Cohen Jessup LLP v. Kassel (2007) (Attorney/Client Fee Arbitration)

Gray Cary Ware & Freidenreich v Vigilant Insurance Co. (2004) (Cumis Counsel)

Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd.  (2008) (Exceeding Powers)

Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd. (2008) (Preemption)

Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd. (2008) (Vacatur - International)

Guisenov v. Burns (2006) (Disclosure)

Guisenov v. Burns (2006) (Waiver of Appeal)

Hall Street Associates Inc v Mattel Inc (2008) (Errors of Law)

Haworth v Superior Court, (2008) (Disclosure)

Higgins v. Superior Court (2006) (Unconscionability)

Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) (Fraud in the Execution)

Independent Association of Mailbox Center Owners, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) (Forum Fees)

Independent Association of Mailbox Center Owners, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) (Remedy Restrictions)

Independent Association of Mailbox Center Owners, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) (Unconscionability)

Jakks Pacific Inc v Superior Court (2008) (Disclosure)

 

Klussman v. Cross Country Bank (2005) (Injunctive Relief)

Lee v. Southern California University for Professional Studies (2007) (Injunctive Relief)

Lee v. Southern California University for Professional Studies (2007) (Nonsignatories)

Long v Century Indemnity Co. (2008) (Cumis Counsel)

Luce Forward Hamilton & Scripps LLP v Koch (2008) (Disclosure)

Martinez v Master Protection Corp (2004) (Court Appointed Arbitrator)

Morgan Phillips, Inc. v. JAMS/Endispute (2006) (Immunity)

Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc. (9th Cir 2006) (Arbitrability)

Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc. (9th Cir 2006) (Forum Fees)

Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc. (9th Cir 2006) (Forum Selection)

Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc. (9th Cir 2006) (Repeat Players)

Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc. (9th Cir 2006) (Severance)

Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc. (9th Cir 2006) (Unconscionability)

Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc. (9th Cir 2006) (Waiver of Litigation)

Nguyen v. Tran (2007) (Nonsignatories)

Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc. (2008) (Arbitrability)

Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA) Inc. (2008) (Discovery Restrictions)

Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc. (2008) (Forum Fees)

Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc. (2008) (Repeat Players)

Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA) Inc. (2008) (Severance)

Ovitz v. Schulman (2005) (Disclosure)

Ovitz v. Schulman (2005) (Preemption)

Preston v Ferrer (2008) (Arbitrability)

Preston v Ferrer (2008) (Preemption)

Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) (Agreement to Arbitrate)

Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) (Medical Services Agreement)

Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) (Consolidation in Litigation)

Rodriguez v Blue Cross of California (2008) (Medical Services Agreement)

Roehl v. Ritchie (2007) (Award Correction)

Sanford v. Member Works, Inc. (9th Cir 2007) (Appeal - Federal)

Sanford v. Member Works, Inc. (9th Cir 2007) (Arbitrability)

Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leek Gamble & Mallory LLP (2007) (Attorney/Client Fee Arbitration)

Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) (Preemption)

Shroyer v New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc. (9th Cir 2007) (Class Action Waiver)

Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc. (9th Cir 2007) (Preemption)

Schoenduve Corporation v. Lucent Technologies, Inc. (9th Cir 2006)

 

Titolo v. Cano (2007) (Medical Services Agreement)

Turtle Ridge Media Group, Inc. v. Pacific Bell Directory (2006) (Nonsignatories)

Veliz v. Cintas Corp. (ND Cal 2005) (Forum Fees)

Veliz v. Cintas Corp. (ND Cal 2005) (Venue)

Woolls v. Superior Court (2005) (Preemption)

Woolls v. Superior Court (2005) (Residential Contracts)

 

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Case List By Subject/Full Review

 

Agreement to Arbitrate

 

Reigelsperger v. Siller, 40 Cal 4th 574, 53 Cal Rptr 3d 887 (2007)-An agreement to arbitrate that pertains to all transactions “now or in the future” applies to future transactions even if the parties did not contemplate future transactions at the time that the agreement was executed. This does not mean that the agreement binds the parties in perpetuity. Arbitration agreements that do not specify a term of duration are terminable at will after a reasonable time has elapsed.

 

Appeal-Federal Court

 

Sanford v. Member Works, Inc., 483 F 3d 956, 961 (9th Cir 2007)-Defendant moved to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s class action complaint. The motion was granted, but the court stated that if the arbitration were not completed within twelve months, it would dismiss the case. After the arbitration was completed within the requisite period, plaintiff moved to vacate, continuing to argue that the dispute was not arbitrable. The motion was denied and plaintiff appealed. Defendant argued that plaintiff had waived her right to appeal because she should have appealed from the initial ruling compelling arbitration, citing Section 16(a)(3) of the FAA which provides for an immediate appeal of a “final decision with respect to an arbitration”. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. The order compelling arbitration was not a final decision. An order granting a motion to compel arbitration and dismissing the action without prejudice constitutes an appealable final decision. An order compelling arbitration and staying the case is not immediately appealable. Here, there was no final decision because the court did not dismiss plaintiff’s claim and instead stated that it would terminate the action if the arbitration were not completed within twelve months.

 

Appeal to Second Arbitrator

 

Cummings v. Future Nissan, 128 Cal App 4th 321, 27 Cal Rptr. 3d 10, n. 4 (2005)-A second level of review, even if it imports judicial standards for review of a civil judgment on appeal and therefore erodes the traditional informality of arbitration is not invalid so long as there is no dollar amount threshold for invoking it (which would make it almost exclusively an employer remedy). The Court also held, at p. 331, that the second arbitrator was not limited by the holding in Moncharsh v Heily & Blasé, 3 Cal 4th 1 (1992) when ruling on the appeal.

 

Arbitrability

  

Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 US 440, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed 2d 1038 (2006)-A decision by the Florida Supreme Court denying the arbitration of a dispute arising out of a contract that was alleged to be void because it was usurious was reversed. Previous Supreme Court rulings in Prima Paint v Conklin and Southland v. Keating established three propositions. First, as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract. Second, unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, then the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance. Third, this arbitration law applies in state as well as federal courts. Thus, because the plaintiffs challenged the agreement but not the arbitration clause specifically, the arbitration provisions are enforceable apart from the remainder of the contract. This decision effectively overruled Hotels-Nevada LLC v Bridge Banc LLC, 130 Cal App 4th 1431, 30 Cal Rptr 3d 903 (2005).

Nagrampa v. Mailcoups,Inc., 2006 US App LEXIS 29687(9th Cir 2006)-When the crux of the complaint is not the invalidity of the contract as a whole, but rather the arbitration provision itself, then the court, not the arbitrator, must decide whether  the arbitration clause is invalid and unenforceable.

Sanford v. Member Works, Inc., 483 F 3d 956, 963-4 (9th Cir 2007)-Plaintiff purchased a set of fitness tapes in response to a television advertisement and when the tapes were sent to her, they were accompanied by a membership in a program operated by defendant that provided discounts to program members. The membership material also contained a contract with an arbitration clause. Plaintiff’s credit card was charged $72. She filed a class action alleging violation of 39 USC 3009, which makes the mailing of unordered merchandise an unfair trade practice. Defendant moved to compel arbitration. Plaintiff argued that no contract was formed. The District Court ruled that since plaintiff challenged the contract as a whole, the decision whether there was a valid contract belonged to the arbitrator. Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award of $72 was denied by the District Court but that decision was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Issues regarding the validity or enforcement of a putative contract mandating arbitration should be referred to an arbitrator, but challenges to the existence of a contract as a whole must be determined by the court prior to ordering arbitration.

Baker v. Osborne Development Corp., 159 Cal App 4th 884, 893-4, 71 Cal Rptr 3d 854 (2007)-The arbitration clause in this contract provided that all issues concerning enforceability or validity of the contract would be decided by the arbitrator. But the same section of the agreement contained a severability provision in the event that “any provision of this arbitration agreement shall be determined by the arbitrator or by any court to be unenforceable”.  Plaintiffs opposed defendant’s motion to compel arbitration on the ground that the contract was unconscionable. The trial court found the issue of who decides arbitrability to be ambiguous and denied the motion to compel. The appellate court agreed. Although one provision of the arbitration agreement stated that issues of enforceability and voidability were to be decided by the arbitrator, another provision indicated that the court might find a provision to be unenforceable. Thus, the arbitration agreement did not clearly and unmistakably reserve to the arbitrator the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable.

Preston v Ferrer,  128 S. Ct 978, 169 L.E. 2d 917, 2008 US LEXIS 2011 (2008)-Plaintiff  filed an arbitration proceeding to collect sums due him from defendant, a television personality, pursuant to their contract. Defendant claimed that plaintiff was a talent agent and that the contract was void because plaintiff had failed to obtain the license required by the Talent Agencies Act (“TAA”), Labor Code Sections 1700 et seq. Plaintiff asserted that he was a personal manager and therefore did not have to obtain the license required by the TAA. The TAA gives the California Labor Commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to hear disputes involving it. A party dissatisfied with the Commissioner’s decision can seek a trial de novo in Superior Court or file an arbitration demand if there is a valid arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeal enjoined plaintiff from proceeding with the arbitration unless and until the Commissioner ruled that she did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute. It held that Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, supra, was inapposite because it did not apply to administrative proceedings. In his argument before the Supreme Court, defendant asserted that allowing parties to proceed directly to arbitration would undermine the Labor Commissioner’s ability to stay informed of potential illegal activity and would deprive artists protected by the TAA of the Commissioner’s expertise. He also argued that his position to did not deprive plaintiff of his right to arbitrate, it merely postponed it. The Court rejected defendant’s arguments and reversed. With respect to the postponement argument, a prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve streamlined proceedings and expeditious results. That objective would be frustrated even if plaintiff could compel arbitration in lieu of de novo Superior Court review. With respect to the other argument, plaintiff’s petition presents only a question concerning the forum in which the parties’ dispute will be heard. Defendant relinquishes no substantive rights the TAA may accord him. But under the contract he signed, he cannot escape resolution of those rights in an arbitral forum

Bruni v Didion, 160 Cal App 4th 1272, 1287, 73 Cal Rptr 3d 395 (2008)-Where a party asserts that it has never agreed to an arbitration provision, it cannot be required to arbitrate anything—note even arbitrability—until a court has made a threshold determination that the party did, in fact, agree to arbitrate something. In such a case,  the court makes the determination even if the arbitration clause provides that the arbitrator decides arbitrability.

Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 79 Cal Rptr 3d 471 (2008)-The court found here that a clause providing that the arbitrator shall decide arbitrability set forth in an adhesion contract that contained multiple examples of unconscionability is itself substantively unconscionable and hence unenforceable. The court also followed the holding in Bruni v Didion, supra, that the court decides arbitrability if it finds that the party opposing arbitration never agreed to arbitrate. Plaintiff herein met that threshold because the undisputed circumstances in which she received and signed the agreement—including her receipt of the one page document in a binder file along with numerous other employment related documents, the lack of time for any real review of the documents, and the failure of anyone to explain the significance of the agreement—supported her claim that she did not know that she had signed an agreement to arbitrate until she filed suit and the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration.

RN Solution, Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare West. 165 Cal App 4th 1511, 1523, 81 Cal Rptr 3d 892 (2008)-RN and its founder-president, Woo, brought suit against Catholic Healthcare West (“CHW”) and a former employee of CHW arising largely out of the termination of a contract between RN and CHW. The individual defendant was the CHW employee who administered the contract. There was no dispute that the contractual claims were arbitrable. However, Woo also alleged claims of gender discrimination and sexual battery against the defendants arising from an intimate relationship between Woo and the CHW employee. The employee moved to compel arbitration of these claims as well. The motion was denied and the decision was affirmed on appeal. The arbitration clause in issue was part of an agreement between two business entities governing their business relationship. While the language of the arbitration provision might be broadly construed to cover every type of business dispute that might arise between the two signators, it cannot be seriously argued that the parties intended it to cover tort claims arising from a violent physical assault by an employee of one company against an employee of the other in the context of an intimate domestic relationship between them.

 

Attorney/Client Fee Arbitrations

  

Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leek Gamble & Mallory LLP, 146 Cal App 4th 674, 53 Cal Rptr 3d 173 (2007)-Under the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act (“MFAA”), prospective waivers of trial after arbitration are not allowed. The parties may only agree to be bound by arbitration after a fee dispute arises. Moreover, when a client invokes the MFAA, any binding arbitration is the arbitration conducted by the local bar association under the MFAA, not some private alternate dispute resolution provided by another forum. A client may waive nonbinding arbiration by failing to follow MFAA procedures, or a client may opt for binding arbitration under a retainer agreement rather than nonbinding arbitration under the MFAA and perhaps a trial de novo.

Ervin Cohen Jessup LLP v. Kassel, 147 Cal App 4th 821, 54 Cal Rptr 3d 685 (2007)-Once a client waives his right to proceed under the MFAA, he cannot invoke the MFAA as a means of avoiding the agreement for binding arbitration of all disputes contained in the retainer agreement.

 

Award Correction

 

Roehl v. Ritchie, 147 Cal App 4th 338, 351, 54 Cal Rptr 3d 185 (2007)- An arbitrator may use a multiple incremental or successive award process as a means, in an appropriate case, of finally deciding all submitted issues. In such event, the second award stands on its own, is not  considered to be an award correction, and is not subject to the 30 day limitation for correcting awards set forth in CCP Section 1286.6. On the other hand, there are limitations to such incremental awards and an arbitrator has no power to use the incremental award process to correct or modify the terms of an original award.

 

Class Action Not Mentioned

Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc., 44 Cal 4th 1334, 82 Cal Rptr 3d 229

 (2008)-The agreement herein, entered into between DirecTV and its dealers, made no reference to class actions. The agreement did require the arbitrators to apply the substantive law of California. The dealers commenced a class action in arbitration. Following the procedure required by AAA rules, the arbitrators initially determined that the class action could proceed. The Court of Appeal affirmed  this determination, holding that the right to pursue classwide arbitration is substantive, based on the decision in Keating v Superior Court, 31 Cal 3d 584 (1982). The Supreme Court reversed. The Keating rule is that courts have the authority to order classwide arbitration when an arbitration clause appears in a contract of adhesion and gross unfairness would result from the denial of the opportunity to proceed on a classwide basis. The Keating court did not speak to whether arbitrators have that authority. It has since been held by the Supreme Court that whether an arbitration clause is unconscionable is for the courts to decide, not the arbitrator. Here, the dealers did not claim and the arbitrators did not find that the contract was adhesive, or that a denial of classwide arbitration would lead to gross unfairness. Furthermore, the arbitrators did not need to turn to Keating for authority to order classwide arbitration. The AAA rule required them to “determine as a threshold matter in a reasoned partial final award on the construction of the arbitration clause, whether the applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf or against a class”.

 

 

Class Action Waivers

 

Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal 4th 148, 30 Cal Rptr 3d 76 (2005)-Although all class action waivers are not necessarily unconscionable, when the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then the waiver will be held to be unconscionable. On remand, the provision was upheld because the contract contained a Delaware choice of law clause, the complaint was filed on behalf of a nationwide class and alleged violation of Delaware law, and no California causes of action were contained therein. Discover Bank v Superior Court, 134 Cal App 4th 886, 36 Cal Rptr 3d 456 (2005).  In Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., 134 Cal App 4th 544, 36 Cal Rptr 3d 229 (2005), where the plaintiff sued on behalf of a class of California residents only under a contract that contract that contained a Georgia choice of law clause and alleged only violations of California law, and in Klussman v. Cross Country Bank, 134 Cal App 4th 1283, 36 Cal Rptr 3d 728 (2005) where the plaintiffs sued a Delaware corporation under a contract that did not contain a choice of law clause on behalf of a nationwide class, asserting violations of both Delaware and California law, the court held that California law applied and found the class action waiver to be unconscionable. See also Independent Association of Mail Box Center Owners, Inc. v. Superior Court, 136 Cal App 4th 396, 34 Cal Rptr 3d 659 (2005) where the court found a JAMS ban on group arbitration to be unenforceable.

Shroyer v New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 498 F 3d 976 (9th Cir 2007)-A class action waiver is unconscionable if 1) it is a consumer contract of adhesion drafted by the party with superior bargaining power; 2) it involves small amounts of damages suffered by each member of the class; and 3) it is alleged that the party with superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small amounts of money. All three prongs applied here. The contract was one of adhesion, involving consumers and drafted by the party with superior bargaining power. It involved small amounts of damages by the individual members of the class because the monthly charges ranged from $9.99 to $59.99. And the third prong was met because plaintiffs alleged that defendant had entered into a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers by representing to them that their services would be improved only if they entered into contract extensions with defendant following its merger with AT&T Wireless Services. See also Lowden v T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F 3d 1213 (9th Cir 2008).

 

Consolidation with Other Matters in Litigation (Section 1281.2(c) )

 

Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services, 35 Cal 4th  376, 25 Cal Rptr 2d 540 (2005)-Plaintiffs and defendants entered into six concurrent agreements that related to the transfer of a home management business from one of the plaintiffs to one of the defendants. Four of the six agreements contained arbitration clauses. Each of the agreements that contained an arbitration provision stated that they were subject to the law of California but that “the designation of …a governing law for this agreement or the arbitration shall not be deemed an election to preclude application of the [FAA] if it would be applicable”. After a disagreement arose, plaintiffs filed suit pursuant to all six agreements and thus their complaint contained both arbitrable and non-arbitrable causes of action. Defendants filed a cross complaint against plaintiffs and others who were not subject to the arbitration agreements. Plaintiffs moved to compel arbitration and stay the litigation while defendants moved to stay the arbitration pending the outcome of the litigation and to consolidate the arbitration proceeding with the litigation. Both motions were filed pursuant to Section 1281.2(c). The court granted defendants’ motion. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA applied, thus superceding the California choice of law clause as provided in the agreements and that, in any event, the FAA preempted Section 1281.2(c). The decision is affirmed. The Court holds that the generic reference to California law included its arbitration law, citing the decision in Mount Diablo Medical Center, 101 Cal App 4th 711, 124 Cal Rptr 2d 607 (2002). Section 3 of the FAA requires “the courts of the United States” to grant a party’s request for a stay of litigation on an arbitrable issue, pending completion of the arbitration. Section 4 concerns petitions for enforcement of an arbitration agreement where one party refuses to arbitrate. It requires a “United States district court” to entertain an application to compel arbitration. Thus, they apply to federal, not state, court proceedings. Section 1281.2(c) is not preempted by the FAA. It is not a special rule limiting the authority of arbitrators. It is an evenhanded law that allows the trial court to stay arbitration proceedings while the concurrent lawsuit proceeds or stay the lawsuit while arbitration proceeds to avoid conflicting rulings on common issues of fact and law among interrelated parties.

Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc., 136 Cal App 4th 1110, 1122, 39 Cal Rptr. 3d 437 (2006)-In the Cronus case, above, although the Court found that the FAA did not apply and invoked Section 1281.2(c), it also held that parties to an arbitration contract could expressly designate that the FAA would apply, in which event there would be a different result. In this case, the arbitration contract provided that disputes between the parties would be settled by arbitration “pursuant to the FAA” and the Court held that this met the exception cited in Cronus. The phrase ‘pursuant to the FAA” is broad and unconditional, unlike the Cronus clause, which deferred to the contract’s California choice of law provisions by invoking only “applicable” provisions of the FAA. The parties thus adopted the FAA---all of it---to govern their arbitration. The FAA controls, including Section 3, which requires the court to stay the judicial proceedings and compel arbitration. Although Section 3 may not generally apply to state courts, here the parties did as Cronus suggested they could. They expressly designated that their arbitration proceeding should move forward under the FAA’s procedural provisions rather than under state procedural law.

RN Solution, Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare West. 165 Cal App 4th 1511, 1523, 81 Cal Rptr 3d 892 (2008)-RN Solution and its founder-president, Woo, filed suit against Catholic Healthcare West (“CHW”) and a former employee arising primarily as a consequence of the termination by CHW of a contract that it had with RN. The individual defendant was the person at CHW who administered the contract.  However, the complaint also contained allegations of gender discrimination and sexual battery alleged by Woo as a consequence of an intimate relationship that she had had with the individual defendant. Because Woo and the individual defendant were not parties to the contract, the court invoked Section 1281.2(c) and denied defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.  The decision was reversed. Woo benefited financially and professionally from the contract and thus was bound by the arbitration agreement. The individual defendant was CHW’s agent with respect to the contract and, as such, was also bound by the arbitration agreement and could enforce it. The gender discrimination and sexual battery claims were non-arbitrable.  Hence, the court should have ordered all the arbitrable claims to arbitration. The court would then have had the discretion to delay its order to arbitrate the arbitrable claims under Section 1281.2(c), only if it first determined that the adjudication of the non-arbitrable claims in court might make the arbitration unnecessary.

 

Court Appointed Arbitrator (Section  1281.6)

 

Martinez v Master Protection Corp, 118 Cal App 4th 107, 120, 12 Cal Rptr 3d 663 (2004)-The arbitration agreement in this case required arbitration before the AAA. But the AAA refused to hear the case because the defendant’s arbitration policy did not comport with the AAA’s due process protocol. The court thereupon appointed a retired judge to hear the case pursuant to Section 1281.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The arbitrator ruled against plaintiff, he appealed, the decision to appoint a substitute arbitrator was reversed, and the case was remanded for trial in the Superior Court. Section 1281.6 is simply a legislative means of implementing California’s policy in favor of arbitration by permitting parties to an arbitration contract to expedite the arbitrator selection process. Section 1281.6 does not permit the trial court to choose an alternate forum when the chosen forum refuses to hear the case.

 

Cumis Counsel

 

Gray Cary Ware & Freidenreich v Vigilant Insurance